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The choice of a meaningful baseline condition is a crucial issue for each experimental
design. In the case of cognitive emotion regulation, it is common to either let participants
passively view emotional stimuli without any further speciﬁc instructions or to instruct
them to actively attend to and permit any arising emotions, and to contrast one of these
baseline conditions with a regulation condition.While the “view” strategy can be assumed
to allow for a more spontaneous emotional response, the “permit” strategy may result in
a more pronounced affective and cognitive response. As these conceptual differences
may be associated with differences both in subjective emotional experience and neural
activation, we compared these two common control conditions within a single functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, during which participants were instructed
to either passively view a set of unpleasant and neutral pictures or to actively permit any
emotions arising in response to the unpleasant pictures.Trial-by-trial ratings conﬁrmed that
participants perceived the unpleasant pictures as more arousing than the neutral pictures,
but also indicated higher subjective arousal during the “permit negative” as compared
to the “view negative” and “view neutral” conditions. While both the “permit negative”
and “view negative” conditions led to increased activation of the bilateral amygdala when
contrasted with the passive viewing of neutral pictures, activation in the left amygdala was
increased in response to the “permit” instruction as compared to the “view” instruction for
unpleasant pictures. The increase in amygdala activation in both the “permit” and “view”
conditions renders both strategies as suitable baseline conditions for studies of cognitive
emotion regulation. Conceptual and activation differences, however, indicate that these
two variants are not exchangeable and should be chosen depending on the experimental
context.
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INTRODUCTION
In a typical fMRI experiment in the ﬁeld of cognitive emotion
regulation, participants are confronted with an emotional stim-
ulus and are asked to regulate their affective responses using
a particular strategy. This may involve changing one’s atten-
tional focus, the way to interpret the emotional stimulus, or
one’s visible response toward it (Gross, 1998). Across a grow-
ing number of studies, a general pattern of results has emerged,
which usually involves increased activation in a cognitive con-
trol network and decreased activation in one or more affective
target regions, most notably, although not exclusively, the amyg-
dala (Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner et al., 2012). Still, heterogeneity
of samples, stimuli, and experimental designs limits the com-
parability across experiments, meta-analytic integration, and,
ultimately, translation into applied domains. To address this issue,
one strategy is to decompose the complex construct of emotion
regulation into an ensemble of sequential elementary processes,
which may be better suited for rigorous experimental investiga-
tion (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). A complementary approach is
to explore and systematically vary the deﬁning features of cogni-
tive emotion regulation paradigms. This is an aim of the present
study.
Among the many variables relevant for the design of emo-
tion regulation paradigms, the instructions on how to regulate
emotions are of critical importance. They are the main means
of experimental manipulation for emotion regulation strategies
such as reappraisal, detachment, or intensiﬁcation. They all have
in common that they pose high cognitive demand in terms of,
e.g., verbal abilities and self-regulatory capacities. Consequently,
the success of the experimental manipulation will highly depend
on the degree of participants’ understanding of and adherence to
the instructions. While several reports already have investigated
the efﬁcacy of different regulatory strategies (McRae et al., 2010;
Kanske et al., 2011), the issue of selecting a valid control or base-
line condition has received less attention so far. One study by
Schaefer et al. (2002) demonstrated greater amygdala activation
for an instruction to actively maintain the emotional response
than for an instruction to passively view an emotional stimu-
lus; this effect, however, was most pronounced not during, but
after the presentation of the emotional stimulus. The selection
of an appropriate baseline condition, however, is as important as
the choice of an effective treatment condition, since fMRI usu-
ally involves contrasting two or more experimental conditions.
Due to this relative nature of fMRI effects, the conclusions that
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can be drawn from a given study will depend not only on the
treatment condition, but also on its counterpart, the control
or baseline condition, against which the effects of interest are
compared.
Several variants of control or baseline conditions have been
employed in recent studies on cognitive emotion regulation: fre-
quently, participants are instructed to simply view emotional
stimuli and respond naturally without regulation, which is com-
monly referred to as “passive viewing” (Harenski and Hamann,
2006; Mak et al., 2009). Alternatively, participants may be asked
to speciﬁcally attend to the emotional stimulus without referring
to the emotional reaction [“attentive viewing”; e.g., Urry et al.
(2006) and Taylor et al. (2003)]. Finally, another common choice
is to instruct participants to “Look at stimulus directly and permit
feeling your emotions,” i.e., to actively permit any emotions aris-
ing in response to the emotional stimulus [“emotional allowance”;
e.g., Wager et al. (2008) and Walter et al. (2009)]. In being more
detailed than the passive viewing instruction, this instruction is
similar to the attentive viewing instruction; it puts, however, more
emphasis on the experiential aspect of the emotional response than
on the emotional stimulus per se.
All of the above instructions share the goals of maximizing
the effect of the emotion induction and providing an interpre-
tation as unambiguous as possible. However, they are also likely
to stimulate different affective and cognitive processes: attentive
viewing and emotional allowance, for example, can be assumed
to result in a more thorough evaluation of the emotional stimu-
lus and/or response, possibly involving higher cognitive processes
such as attention or language; they may, however, differ with
regard to an internal (emotional allowance) vs. external (attentive
viewing) focus of attention. Passive viewing, due to its unspe-
ciﬁc nature and less amount of experimental control, may allow
for a more spontaneous emotional response, possibly resulting in
a stronger inﬂuence of individual differences or situational fac-
tors. Altogether, it is likely that the use of different instructions
will result in both quantitative and qualitative differences in sub-
jective affective experience, cognitive processes, and physiological
activation.
We therefore investigated the behavioral and neural effects
of two different baseline conditions by directly comparing them
within one single experiment. Speciﬁcally, we chose to compare
the emotional allowance and passive viewing strategies, i.e., the
“permit” and “view” instructions, which have frequently been
employed as baseline conditions before. We hypothesized that the
“permit” instruction would lead to an increase in activation in
brain regions subserving the generation of emotional responses,
and therefore deﬁned the left and right amygdala as our regions
of interest. Apart from that, all other analyses were conducted in
an exploratory way, since the contributions of other brain regions
to differences between the experimental conditions are not well
deﬁned yet.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-two volunteers (12 male, age range 18–48 years, age
mean ± SD = 24.7 ± 5.2 years) were recruited from the university
community and participated in this study. All of the participants
were right-handed and did not report any current medical or prior
or current neurological or psychiatric illness or treatment. The
experimental protocolwas approvedby the ethics committee of the
Technische Universität Dresden. All participants provided written
informed consent and received ﬁnancial compensation for their
time and effort.
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM AND PROCEDURE
In our experimental task, participants were asked to either pas-
sively view a set of unpleasant and neutral pictures or to actively
permit any emotions arising in response to a set of unpleasant
pictures. We did not include a “permit neutral” condition in the
experiment due to economical reasons and an assumed lack of
validity of this condition, since we assumed that there would likely
be no initial emotional reaction for neutral stimuli that might be
the target of subsequent emotional allowance.
Written instructions gave an explanation and some exam-
ples of these modes of processing: for the “view neutral” and
“view negative” conditions, participants were asked to simply
view the pictures. We intentionally refrained from giving any
further speciﬁc instructions in order to elicit a maximally spon-
taneous emotional reaction. For the “permit negative” condition,
participants were asked to take a close look at the picture and
permit any emotions that might arise as a result. They were
encouraged, but not obliged, to imagine immediately witness-
ing the depicted situation, and asked not to re-interpret the
situation, to voluntarily intensify their emotions, or to distract
themselves.
To ensure understanding of the instructions and familiarity
with the procedure, all participants underwent a training ses-
sion outside the MR scanner, which took about 10–15 min
and consisted of 16 trials. After completion, they were asked to
explain what they did; if this report was incompatible with prior
instructions or participants reported difﬁculties with the task,
instructions were explained for a second time, and participants
were asked to do another training session. All stimuli used in
the training session were different from those used in the main
experiment.
The subsequent fMRI measurement lasted for approximately
55 min. In the beginning of the session, about 5 min were spent
with preparatory technical scans, which allowed the participants
to accommodate themselves with the scanning environment. Two
experimental runs followed with a duration of 15 min each, and
afterwards an anatomical scan was acquired, which lasted approx-
imately 7 min. Finally, an emotional reactivity experiment took
place, which is not the focus of the present study. After completing
the scanning session, participants were asked to ﬁll in a question-
naire regarding their subjective experience, and were debriefed
about the experiment. Several participants also completed a num-
ber of additional questionnaires aimed at investigating individual
differences, or took part in a second session encompassing another
emotion regulation experiment; both will be the subject of a
subsequent report.
Similar to previous studies (McRae et al., 2010; Kanske et al.,
2011), we used an event-related design (in contrast to a block
design) in order to be able to avoid multiple repetitions of stimuli
of the same experimental condition andpossibly ensuing increased
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habituation effects. We further used a relatively slow rate of stimu-
lus presentations in order to allow for sufﬁcient time to implement
a processing strategy, and in order to prevent the introduction
of additional task-switching demands, which are to be expected
if changes between experimental conditions occur at a rapid
pace.
In particular, each of the two experimental runs consisted of
30 trials: 10 trials each for “permit negative” and “view nega-
tive” and another 10 trials for “view neutral.” At the beginning
of each trial, a picture was presented for 8000 ms. During the
initial 2000 ms of this period, a semi-transparent overlay was
presented across the center of the picture, which contained, as
a single word, the instruction for either the “view” or the “per-
mit” condition. As detailed above, “permit” was presented only
for negative pictures, while “view” was presented for both neutral
and negative pictures. Subsequently, participants were asked to
give a rating of their momentary subjective arousal, which lasted
for 3000 ms. The rating was intended to reﬂect the critical role
of the amygdala in arousal regulation (Hamann, 2012). There-
fore, it asked “How aroused do you feel at the very moment?”
and participants responded by moving a horizontal slider to a
position between the two extremes “very much aroused” and “not
at all aroused.” Following the rating, a ﬁxation cross was pre-
sented for a period of 12000 ms. This extended ﬁxation period was
inserted into the trial to allow the return of the BOLD response
to baseline levels. After another arousal rating (3000 ms), which
was included to assess subjective arousal levels at the end of the
ﬁxation period, and a variable interval with a mean duration of
4000 ms, during which a ﬁxation cross was presented, the next trial
began. Altogether, the duration of a single trial was, on average,
30 s.
Stimuli were selected from the International Affective Pic-
ture System (Lang et al., 2008). We used four sets of negative
pictures and two sets of neutral pictures (20 pictures per set),
which were matched for content, arousal, and valence, respec-
tively (mean valence of negative images: V 1 = 2.78, V 2 = 2.81,
V 3 = 2.67,V 4 = 2.76; mean arousal of negative images: A1 = 5.74,
A2 = 5.74, A3 = 5.54, A4 = 5.64; mean valence for neutral
images: V 5 = 5.16, V 6 = 4.98; mean arousal for neutral images:
A5 = 2.86, A6 = 3.04). Neither the negative, nor the neutral
sets of images differed in their arousal [negative: F(3,76) = 0.281,
p = 0.839; neutral: F(1,38) = 0.985, p = 0.327] or valence [nega-
tive: F(3,76) = 0.121, p = 0.947; neutral: F(1,38) = 0.902, p = 0.348]
ratings, and thus were collapsed into two sets of negative and
neutral images, which, in contrast, were clearly distinct in their
valence [t(118) = –16.464, p < 0.001] and arousal [t(118) = 19.240,
p < 0.001] ratings. The negative pictures consisted primarily of
depictions of animals, bodies, disaster, disgust, injuries, suffering,
or violence, while the neutral pictures depicted various scenes,
objects and people. In order to rule out any stimulus- or content-
related confounds, two sets of negative pictures and one set of
neutral pictures were used for one half of the participants, and the
other two negative and one neutral sets were used for the other
half of the participants. The distributions of faces or others parts
of the body, depictions of single persons, depictions of multiple
persons, any natural stimuli, or inanimate objects or scenes did
not differ between the picture sets. The assignment of the negative
pictures to either the “view negative” or “permit negative” con-
dition was counterbalanced across participants. All stimuli were
presented onto a back-projection screen located at the rear end
of the scanner and were viewed through a mirror attached to the
head coil.
DATA ACQUISITION
Magnetic resonance (MR) imaging was done on a 3 Tesla scanner
(Siemens Trio; Siemens Erlangen, Germany), using a 12 channel
head coil. Functional (T2∗)MR images were acquired using an EPI
sequence with 42 axial slices (slice thickness 2 mm) per volume
(TR 2410 ms; TE 25 ms; ﬂip angle 80◦; slice gap 1 mm; ﬁeld of
view 192 mm; matrix size 64 × 64). In addition, anatomical (T1)
images were acquired using an MPRAGE sequence that consisted
of 176 sagittal slices with a thickness of 1 mm (TR 1900 ms; TE
2.26 ms; ﬂip angle 9◦; FOV 256 mm; matrix size 256 × 256).
DATA ANALYSIS
Imaging data analysis was performed using Matlab 7.4 (Math-
Works, Natick, MA, USA) and SPM 81. After discarding the
ﬁrst four volumes of each run, preprocessing consisted of slice-
timing correction, motion correction, coregistration of individual
functional and anatomical data, spatial normalization of the
anatomical images to the MNI template, application of the esti-
mated transformation parameters to the coregistered functional
images using a resampling resolution of 2 mm × 2mm × 2 mm,
and spatial smoothing of the functional images (FWHM 8 mm).
First-level statistical analysis was performed using a general
linear model with three regressors for the experimental condi-
tions “view neutral,” “view negative,” “permit negative.” Two
additional regressors of no interest were included to account
for possible effects of the early and late ratings and to avoid
potential misattribution of these effects to one of the regressors
modeling the response to the IAPS pictures. All above regres-
sors were convolved with the canonical HRF. Since the effects of
head motion on fMRI time-series are likely more complex than
simple linear additive effects, we did not include motion param-
eters as nuisance parameters in the model in favor of keeping
the statistical models as parsimonious and intuitive as possible.
The two imaging runs were combined within a single, unify-
ing ﬁxed-effects model of the two runs. Resulting parameter
estimates for the contrasts of interest during each run were aver-
aged across runs, submitted to a second-level, random-effects
analysis and evaluated using a one-sample t-test. Based on our
a priori hypotheses, we employed two regions of interest, the
left and right amygdala as deﬁned by the AAL atlas (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002; Maldjian et al., 2003), and implemented in
the WFU PickAtlas toolbox for SPM2. For these analyses, we
applied a threshold of p = 0.05 family-wise error (FWE) after
correction for small volume. For all other analyses, a threshold of
p = 0.05 FWE across the whole brain was applied. Since voxel-
wise analyses are necessarily limited in integrating data across a
predeﬁned anatomical structure, we additionally obtained sum-
mary measures for the left and right amygdala. For this purpose,
1http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8
2http://www.nitrc.org/projects/wfu_pickatlas
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we extracted parameter estimates for all experimental conditions
from the individual ﬁrst-level analyses using the marsbar tool-
box3, and further analyzed these data using t-tests for dependent
samples.
Behavioral data analysis was performed using R 3.0.14, and
consisted of a one-way ANOVA with subsequent post hoc testing
using t-tests for dependent samples. We further conducted an
exploratory correlation analysis of subjective arousal ratings and
changes in amygdala activation using Spearman’s rho. All analyses,
except those conducted within SPM8, were conducted as two-
tailed tests.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
A one-way ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant effect of experimen-
tal condition [F(2,62) = 194.548, p < 0.001] on the subjective
arousal ratings. Planned t-tests revealed signiﬁcant differences for
all pairs of experimental conditions (Figure 1): participants rated
their arousal highest during the “permit negative” condition as
compared with both “view negative” [t(31) = 7.031, p < 0.001]
as well as “view neutral” [t(31) = 16.586, p < 0.001] conditions.
In addition, subjective arousal in the “view negative” condition
was greater than in the “view neutral” condition [t(31) = 13.621,
p < 0.001].
REGIONS OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
An analysis limited to the left and right amygdala yielded signiﬁ-
cant activation increases in the “view negative” as compared to the
“view neutral” condition (Table 1), and this effect was also present
3http://marsbar.sourceforge.net
4http://r-project.org
FIGURE 1 | Mean subjective arousal ratings for the three experimental
conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
in an analysis of extracted values [left amygdala: t(31) = 3.709,
p = 0.001; right amygdala: t(31) = 4.594, p < 0.001; see Figure 2].
Similar activation increases were observed for the “permit nega-
tive” vs. “view neutral” comparison in the left and right amygdala
(Table 1). The analysis of extracted values also showed this effect
for both the left [t(31) = 4.370, p < 0.001] and right [t(31) = 4.178,
p < 0.001] amygdala (Figure 2). Finally, we found a cluster of
greater activation during the “permit negative” condition as com-
pared to the “view negative” condition in the left amygdala (see
Table 1; Figure 3). This was conﬁrmed by an additional analy-
sis of extracted values, which revealed signiﬁcant effects for the
left amygdala [t(31) = 2.079, p = 0.046], but not right amygdala
[t(31) = 1.168, p = 0.252].
EXPLORATORY WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSIS
In addition to our regions of interest analysis for the bilateral
amygdala, we also conducted an exploratory whole-brain anal-
ysis. For this analysis, a comparison of the “view negative” vs.
“view neutral” conditions at a threshold of p = 0.05 FWE revealed
greater activation in the“view negative”condition with prominent
clusters in the middle temporal gyrus, the right inferior frontal
gyrus and the anterior cingulate cortex (see Table 1; Figure 4);
peak differences were observed in the right middle temporal gyrus,
being a part of a large cluster encompassing bilateral occipital and
temporal areas. The reverse contrast revealed that no part of the
brain showed greater activation in the “view neutral” than in the
“view negative” condition.
A comparison of the “permit negative” vs. “view neutral”
conditions revealed greater activation in the “permit negative”
condition, which was most pronounced in the bilateral occipital,
temporal, frontal, and cingulate cortex (see Table 1; Figure 4).
Peak differences were observed in the fusiform gyrus, which
was – similar to the previous comparison – part of an extended
occipitemporal network. No part of the brain showed greater
activation in the “view neutral” than in the “permit negative”
condition.
Finally, a comparison of the “permit negative” vs. “view neg-
ative” conditions did not yield any signiﬁcant results at the
whole-brain level, corrected for multiple comparisons.
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
As a result of an exploratory correlation analysis, we observed a
positive relationship between changes in subjective arousal and
changes in left amygdala activation between the “permit negative”
and “view negative” conditions with a trend toward signiﬁcance
(ρ = 0.324, p = 0.071). There was no such effect for the right
amygdala (ρ = 0.173, p = 0.342). The correlation indicates that
for comparisons of “permit” and “view,” in general, a greater
increase in subjective arousal is associated with a greater increase
in activation in the left amygdala (Figure 5).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to compare two commonly used
baseline conditions for cognitive emotion regulation paradigms.
We contrasted the instructions to passively view neutral and nega-
tive emotional stimuli, respectively, with an instruction to actively
permit any feelings arising in response to emotionally negative
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Table 1 | Results for statistical contrasts between experimental conditions.
Label H BA t p size x y z
View negative > view neutral
Middle temporal gyrus R 19 13.80 <0.001 18612 48 −72 0
Inferior frontal gyrus R 48 10.04 <0.001 1163 40 14 28
Pallidum R − 9.65 <0.001 2035 18 4 8
Supplementary motor area R 8 7.94 <0.001 292 8 24 48
Thalamus L − 7.70 <0.001 60 −22 −30 8
Temporal Pole L 38 7.67 <0.001 194 −40 20 −16
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 7.65 <0.001 137 50 28 2
Inferior frontal gyrus L 48 7.45 0.001 527 −38 10 22
Superior frontal gyrus L 6 6.99 0.002 115 −20 8 68
White matter L − 6.59 0.005 29 −28 −16 −6
Brain stem L/R − 6.56 0.005 49 0 −32 −28
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 6.43 0.007 28 54 40 2
Middle frontal gyrus R 6 6.41 0.008 60 34 2 54
Amygdala* L − 4.70 0.001 122 −30 −4 −20
Amygdala* R − 4.91 0.001 215 26 −2 −14
Permit negative > view neutral
Fusiform gyrus L 37 12.86 <0.001 19312 −40 −52 −12
Inferior frontal gyrus R 38 9.13 <0.001 231 38 26 −18
Brain stem R − 8.96 <0.001 235 2 −32 −2
Pallidum L − 7.96 <0.001 375 −16 0 8
Gyrus rectus L 11 7.95 <0.001 81 −8 50 −20
Inferior frontal gyrus L 47 7.62 <0.001 569 −34 22 −14
Superior frontal gyrus L 6 7.36 0.001 101 −22 8 68
Pallidum R − 7.25 0.001 316 16 6 6
Inferior frontal gyrus R 48 6.86 0.002 341 50 18 20
Precentral gyrus R 6 6.84 0.002 97 50 6 48
Brain stem L − 6.77 0.002 112 −6 −28 −24
Precentral gyrus L 6 6.62 0.003 227 −46 2 32
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 6.60 0.004 128 50 26 2
Supplementary motor area L 6 6.42 0.005 50 −4 14 54
Superior parietal lobe R 7 6.19 0.009 57 22 −64 52
Supplementary motor area R 6 5.86 0.020 35 6 12 66
Amygdala* L − 4.85 0.001 180 −16 −2 −14
Amygdala* R − 4.87 0.001 199 34 2 −20
Permit negative > view negative
Amygdala* L − 3.77 0.014 3 −16 −2 −12
Results marked with an asterisk (*) are thresholded at p = 0.05, FWE-corrected for multiple comparisons for a region of interest; otherwise, all results are thresholded
at p = 0.05, FWE-corrected for the whole brain, and limited to clusters with a spatial extent greater than k = 25 voxels. H, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area, L, left;
R, right. All x, y, z coordinates are in MNI space. Size is given in voxels (8 mm3).
stimuli. Subjective arousal ratings indicated that in the differ-
ent experimental conditions stimuli were processed differently:
as expected, negative stimuli yielded higher arousal ratings than
neutral stimuli, and the“permit”instruction yielded higher ratings
than the “view” instruction. Similarly, we observed differences in
hemodynamic activation between negative and neutral stimuli as
well as “view” and “permit” instructions. The pattern of these
differences, however, was dependent on the speciﬁc contrasts:
while activation differences between neutral and negative stimuli
were present across large parts of the brain, including increased
www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 347 | 5
Diers et al. Baseline conditions for emotion regulation paradigms
FIGURE 2 | Mean activation in the left (A) and right (B) amygdala for the three experimental conditions, based on extracted values from the
anatomically defined ROI volumes (see Materials and Methods). Error bars indicate SEM.
FIGURE 3 | Amygdala activation for the effect of “permit
negative” > “view negative.” Slices are at y = 0 (top left), x = −18 (top
right), and z = −16 (bottom left). Image left is anatomical left. All statistical
images represent t -values and are thresholded at 1.65 ≤ t ≤ 4.00.
activation in the bilateral frontal, temporal, occipital cortex as well
as subcortical areas for negative compared to neutral stimuli, an
activation increase in the“permit negative”condition as compared
to the “view negative” condition was only present for an analysis
restricted to the amygdala.
The signiﬁcant differences in subjective arousal ratings hint
at the success of our emotion induction. At the neural level,
extensive activation differences for comparisons between neg-
ative and neutral stimuli indicate that emotion effects are
present beyond the expected amygdala activation and not nec-
essarily limited to areas typically regarded as emotional brain
areas, although such areas, e.g., the anterior cingulate cor-
tex, were also present. In addition, however, many sensory
and cognitive areas were also activated, such as the occipital
or frontal cortex. This possibly reﬂects attentional feedback cir-
cuits (Sabatinelli et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2005), which may be
triggered by emotion networks. Activation in cortical regions
associated with higher cognitive function may also hint at
the presence of automatic regulatory processes, which may be
present even during seemingly simple tasks. This is consistent
with the idea that emotional responses are not characterized by
either the presence or the absence of emotional regulation, but
rather a varying amount of emotional regulation, depending on
situational or individual factors (Phillips et al., 2008). If that is
the case, “passive viewing” might not be a fully adequate label
for the mental state of the participants during this experimental
condition.
The overall activation patterns for the“view negative”and“per-
mit negative”conditions are similar: they are both characterized by
extensive clusters of activation in the bilateral occipital, temporal,
frontal, and cingulate cortex, and both engage the amygdala, when
contrasted with the “view neutral” condition. From a neural per-
spective, the differences between these two conditions are rather
quantitative than qualitative, and the commonalities are clearly
larger than the differences. Differences between these two condi-
tions, however, were evident in the respective subjective arousal
ratings, and were also present in the left amygdala. It is possible
that similar differenceswould also appear for ROI analyses in other
regions of the brain; this, however, would require an independent
experiment with a strong a priori hypothesis. There was also a
lateralization of this effect, which we observed only in the left,
but not right amygdala. It has been shown that the left amygdala
is more frequently activated during emotional tasks (Baas et al.,
2004) and more susceptible to emotional regulation instructions
(Diekhof et al., 2011). Although not expected a priori, our results
are in agreement with these reports.
Our post hoc ﬁnding of a correlation between changes in sub-
jective arousal and changes in amygdala activation has to be
regarded as an exploratory result and interpreted with caution.
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FIGURE 4 |Whole-brain activation for (A) the effect of “view negative” > “view neutral” and (B) the effect of “permit negative” > “view neutral.”
Image left is anatomical left. All statistical images represent t -values and are thresholded at 4 ≤ t ≤ 8.
FIGURE 5 | Correlation between changes in subjective arousal ratings
between “permit negative” and “view negative” and corresponding
changes in activation the left (A) and right (B) amygdala, based on
extracted values from the anatomically defined ROI volumes.
Values on the x -axis represent decreases (“permit negative” < “view
negative”; indicated by “−”), no change (“permit negative” = “view
negative”; indicated by “0”), and increases (“permit negative” > “view
negative”; indicated by “+,” “++,” and “+++”).
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It may be taken as additional evidence for the validity of our
experimental manipulation, indicating a difference between the
“view negative” and “permit negative” instructions. Still, the
distribution of the contrast estimates also shows that a robust
amygdala increase has been lacking in some participants. While
some variance in emotional responses across participants has
to be expected, it might also be the case that some partic-
ipants could not easily adhere to the experimental task, and
that some emotional allowance was present during the passive
viewing condition, or vice versa. Therefore, this observation sug-
gests that instructions and/or training may beneﬁt from further
reﬁnement.
A recent meta-analysis of amygdala activation has contrasted,
among many other variables, passive viewing with explicit pro-
cessing instructions such as explicit labeling, rating of the emo-
tional stimulus, or feeling the emotion elicited by the stimulus
(Costafreda et al., 2008). A key result was that increased cog-
nitive demand leads to greater amygdala inhibition, which was
also the case for a “feeling” instruction. At ﬁrst sight, this seems
to be a contradiction to our results. However, apart from the
heterogeneity of samples, stimulus materials, and experimen-
tal contexts, the feeling instruction, in particular, included such
diverse instructions as focusing on the self-relevance or trying
to “react normally,” and therefore does not exactly correspond
to our “permit” instruction. Furthermore, results of compar-
isons between and within studies are not directly comparable.
This only holds if the respective control conditions as well as
other experimental variables are comparable. In addition, given
a link between emotional ratings and activation in emotional
brain regions including the amygdala (Anders et al., 2004; Stark
et al., 2007), it is unclear why participants should experience
increased emotional arousal, as they reported in our study, but
not engage – or even disengage – their amygdala at the same
time. Finally, our post-scan ratings of task difﬁculty indicated
that participants did not perceive the task to be particularly
difﬁcult.
This last consideration, together with the absence of strong
frontal effects for the “permit negative” vs. “view negative” com-
parison, hints at an interpretation that cognitive effort may play
a lesser role in our experimental paradigm. Therefore, it might
be the case that increased effort and activation are not neces-
sary for performing this particular task. This also suggests that
the “permit” condition might be dissimilar to emotional up-
regulation, which should involve more cognitive effort as well
as increased activation in regulatory networks (Ochsner et al.,
2004). It is possible that voluntarily permitting one’s emotions
shares some characteristics with emotional up-regulation; how-
ever, up-regulation can be expected to have a much stronger
effect, since there are some cognitive strategies that are part
of up-regulation, but clearly no part of active permission (e.g.,
artiﬁcially exaggerating the emotional experience). Although it
is a post hoc interpretation, it is also likely that our “permit”
instruction does not necessarily involve affect labeling, which
incorporates explicit instructions for high-level processing, and
thus higher cognitive effort, and has been shown to lead to
decreased amygdala activation (Lieberman et al., 2007; Payer et al.,
2012).
In order to better understand the complex construct of emo-
tion regulation, it has been suggested to reframe it in terms of
its constituent sub-components (possibly including attentional
and working memory processes, response inhibition, or con-
ﬂict monitoring; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). To directly infer
such cognitive components from complex emotion regulation
paradigms, however, is not straightforward, since there is little
experimental control on how participants actually implement a
particular regulation strategy. Therefore, claims about cognitive
sub-components are necessarily speculative, but it seems plausi-
ble to assume that attentional processes, possibly interoception,
and possibly self-referential processes play a role for the active
allowance of emotions.
As an example, the instructions to “attend to emotional stim-
uli,” “passively view” and to “attend to emotions elicited” differ
in the degree to which attention is directed toward the emo-
tional stimulus or the emotional response. This corresponds
to differences in the amount of internal vs. external atten-
tion, which have been suggested to be two separable processes
(Chun et al., 2011). We suggest that this also leads to differ-
ences in the amount of automatic emotion regulation, which,
in turn, results in different levels of subjective arousal as well as
amygdala activation. Directing attention toward the emotional
stimulus is likely to stimulate deeper evaluation of emotion-
evoking material. This can be assumed to lead to higher cognitive
engagement, which has been shown to result in automatic down-
regulation of the emotional response (Kalisch et al., 2006). In
this case, less subjective arousal as well as less amygdala activa-
tion can be expected. Passive viewing grants higher degrees of
freedom to the participants, and increased inﬂuence of habitual
response tendencies might lead to increased variance in the emo-
tional responses (Volokhov and Demaree, 2010). It can therefore
be assumed to lead to less overall automatic down-regulation
and higher subjective arousal as well as higher amygdala acti-
vation than the explicit attend condition. Active permission of
the emotional response stimulates an internal focus of attention,
which might reduce automatic down-regulation (Hutcherson
et al., 2005). Therefore, for this condition relatively high (i.e.,
non-decreased) levels of arousal and amygdala activation in com-
parison to the other conditions can be expected. Taken together,
both relative increases and decreases in amygdala activation as
compared to the passive viewing instruction can be expected:
stimulus-focused tasks are more difﬁcult than passive viewing
and could lead to a relative decrease, while response-focused tasks
increase the focus on self-relevant aspects and might lead to a
relative increase.
Froma clinical perspective, these considerations and our results
are in line with the idea that permitting or accepting an emotional
state might be associated with greater distress in the short run
but successful emotion regulation in the long run (Hayes et al.,
1996). The so called “experiential avoidance” is seen as a dys-
functional transdiagnostic process which is successfully treated
via exposure therapy or mindfulness therapy, during which the
patients learn to tolerate and accept emotion experience in order to
beneﬁt from it. Generally, this includes a cognitive aspect (reduc-
tion of dysfunctional interpretation of emotion reaction) as well as
an experiential aspect (actually accepting the physiological aspect
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of the emotion), which might both be addressed in a “permit”
instruction.
A number of limitations of the current study need to
be addressed. First, a recurrent issue for emotion regulation
paradigms is whether or not to include trial-by-trial ratings:
besides keeping participants actively engaged during the task,
ratings ideally provide an immediate means of assessing the par-
ticipants’ current state during each single trial of the experiment,
thereby increasing the amount of experimental control. However,
we cannot rule out the possibility that some participants may
have responded according to their subjective hypotheses about
the experiment, or may not have been able to accurately assess
their emotional state consistently; this, however, is a general draw-
back of explicit emotion ratings (Stark et al., 2007). Further, in
order not to increase the duration and complexity of each trial,
we had to make a choice between arousal and valence ratings,
and both would have been equally justiﬁable. Post-scan ratings,
although not without disadvantages either,might have been useful
for the simultaneous assessment of both measures. Physiolog-
ical measures such as electrodermal activation, heart rate, or
eye-tracking could certainly have supplemented our behavioral
ratings, but we currently know of no other means that could
have replaced them, despite their apparent shortcomings. Sec-
ond, we did not include a mere “attend to stimulus” condition
in our experimental design, but such a comparison would be
needed in order to be able to test the above predictions about
the inﬂuence of internal vs. external attention. Third, from a
methodological point of view, a fully balanced factorial design,
which contains one experimental factor for the stimulus (“neutral”
vs. “negative”) and one factor for the task (“view” vs. “permit”),
would be desirable for future studies, since this will allow a dis-
ambiguation of main and interaction effects. As a consequence of
our incomplete design, the contrast “permit negative” vs. “view
neutral” consists of the variation of two experimental factors,
which limits its interpretability. While we assume that both fac-
tors contribute to the activation difference between the “permit
negative” and “view neutral conditions,” we currently can only
establish a stimulus effect for the “view” condition (“view neu-
tral” vs. “view negative”) and an instruction effect for negative
stimuli (“view negative” vs. “permit negative”). Since we initially
doubted the psychological validity of “permit” instructions for
neutral stimuli and weighted it against the issues of increased
length and complexity, we refrained from implementing this con-
dition. Still, it might be possible that even some seemingly neutral
stimuli elicit emotional responses in some participants, and that
emotional allowance might be applicable in such a case. In this
regard, our retrospective view is not the same as our prospective
view during the planning phase. Variations of our instructions
or stimulus materials, however, could possibly allow for a fac-
torial design, similar to experimental designs investigating the
interaction of attention and emotion (Kanske and Kotz, 2011).
Finally, the overall evidence of differences between the “view”
and “permit” instructions, in this study, is not strong, both with
regard to the strength and spatial extent of the effect. We did
not expect the effect to be lateralized to the left hemisphere, and
cannot determine yet how speciﬁc these effects are, i.e., to which
extent other brain regions besides the amygdala would also show
an effect of the experimental instruction. Therefore, an indepen-
dent replication and extension of the results of this study would
be desirable.
Several directions for future work can be derived from this
study, both based on its results and its limitations. First, one goal
for future work might be the further development of methods
to validate the effects of the experimental manipulations, e.g., by
using psychophysiological methods, by comparing trial-by-trial
and post-scan ratings, and by assessing both valence and arousal,
possibly using the “affect grid” (Russell et al., 1989) as a single
behavioral measure. Together, this might alleviate the controver-
sial issue of behavioral trial-by-trial ratings, which has not been
satisfactorily solved in this study. Second, another goal might
be the characterization of the affective and cognitive processes
underlying the “permit” instruction. In particular, this involves
investigating the contributions of attention, interoception, and
similar subprocesses, which will also help to distinguish active
emotional allowance from voluntary up-regulation of the emo-
tional experience. Third, it would also be helpful to determine the
effects of variations in task difﬁculty and cognitive effort, since
both substantially inﬂuence emotional processing and regulation.
Fourth, future studies should investigate if there are any contrast
or carry-over effects between experimental conditions; in emotion
regulation paradigms, verbal instructions are not always deﬁned
unambiguously, and processing during one experimental condi-
tion may depend on the processing during the other condition
(e.g., participants may internally try to maximize the difference
between two conditions). And ﬁnally, we do not know yet if
speciﬁc forms of either baseline or regulation instructions work
equally well for all individuals or under all circumstances, and it
is also unclear whether or not our results generalize to positive
emotions.
Despite these remaining open questions, the conceptual con-
siderations and empirical evidence presented in this study suggest
that there is no single optimal baseline condition for cognitive
emotion regulation paradigms. The “view” and “permit” instruc-
tions are probably not exchangeable, and appear to have speciﬁc
advantages and disadvantages: passive viewing may result in a
lesser degree of experimental control and accordingly more vari-
able emotional responses, but should be maximally dissimilar
with regard to cognitive effort and associated neural activation
when compared with any form of voluntary emotion regula-
tion. Active permission has not yet been clearly distinguished
from emotional up-regulation, and, also from a clinical per-
spective, might tap on similar mechanisms. It might, however,
maximize the difference in activation between baseline and treat-
ment conditions in emotion regulation paradigms. Accordingly,
an optimal choice will depend on the experimental context: the
“view” instruction might be a good choice for studies investi-
gating differences between emotion regulation strategies, since
passive viewing is not systematically related to effortful regula-
tion; the emotional response itself, however, may be variable
under this condition and possibly lower than its natural maxi-
mum. In contrast, the “permit” instruction might be better suited
todemonstrate emotion regulation effectsper se, because it appears
to maximize the effect of the emotion induction, at the possible
cost of introducing additional volitional processes. We therefore
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conclude that both strategies constitute suitable baseline condi-
tions for studies of cognitive emotion regulation. Due to the
importance of the experimental counterpart to the treatment con-
dition, we suggest that this decision should be made consciously
and carefully.
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